Legal literature and case law depict the infamous conviction of Alfred Dreyfus for treason and espionage in 1899 as a prime example of the power of even grossly fallacious mathematical demonstrations to overwhelm a legal tribunal. This Essay shows that Dreyfus is not a case of mathematics run amok, unchecked and uncomprehended. To the contrary, the defects in the mathematical proof were dramatically exposed, and this evidence did not lead Dreyfus’s judges to condemn him. This history undercuts the reliance of modern courts and commentators on Dreyfus as an indication or illustration of the alleged dangers of probability evidence in criminal cases.
Volume 91 - No. 3
- Note: Maximizing the Min-Max Test: A Proposal To Unify the Framework for Rule 403 Decisions
- Note: Anticompetitive Until Proven Innocent: An Antitrust Proposal To Embargo Covert Patent Privateering Against Small Businesses
- New Economy, Old Biases
- Will LGBT Antidiscrimination Law Follow the Course of Race Antidiscrimination Law?
- “The More Things Change . . .”: New Moves for Legitimizing Racial Discrimination in a “Post-Race” World
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