Legal literature and case law depict the infamous conviction of Alfred Dreyfus for treason and espionage in 1899 as a prime example of the power of even grossly fallacious mathematical demonstrations to overwhelm a legal tribunal. This Essay shows that Dreyfus is not a case of mathematics run amok, unchecked and uncomprehended. To the contrary, the defects in the mathematical proof were dramatically exposed, and this evidence did not lead Dreyfus’s judges to condemn him. This history undercuts the reliance of modern courts and commentators on Dreyfus as an indication or illustration of the alleged dangers of probability evidence in criminal cases.
Volume 91 - No. 3
- Note: Toward Definition, Not Discord: Why Congress Should Amend the Family and Medical Leave Act To Preclude Individual Liability for Supervisors
- Note: Tweeting the Police: Balancing Free Speech and Decency on Government-Sponsored Social Media Pages
- Note: Guardians of Your Galaxy S7: Encryption Backdoors and the First Amendment
- Tie Votes in the Supreme Court
- Knowledge Goods and Nation-States
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