Legal literature and case law depict the infamous conviction of Alfred Dreyfus for treason and espionage in 1899 as a prime example of the power of even grossly fallacious mathematical demonstrations to overwhelm a legal tribunal. This Essay shows that Dreyfus is not a case of mathematics run amok, unchecked and uncomprehended. To the contrary, the defects in the mathematical proof were dramatically exposed, and this evidence did not lead Dreyfus’s judges to condemn him. This history undercuts the reliance of modern courts and commentators on Dreyfus as an indication or illustration of the alleged dangers of probability evidence in criminal cases.
Volume 91 - No. 3
- Note: Copyrighted Laws: Enabling and Preserving Access to Incorporated Private Standards
- Note: Embracing Ambiguity and Adopting Propriety: Using Comparative Law To Explore Avenues for Protecting the LGBT Population Under Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
- Note: Getting Back to Basics: Recognizing and Understanding the Swing Voter on the Supreme Court of the United States
- The Value of the Standard
- The Substantially Impaired Sex: Uncovering the Gendered Nature of Disability Discrimination
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