Legal literature and case law depict the infamous conviction of Alfred Dreyfus for treason and espionage in 1899 as a prime example of the power of even grossly fallacious mathematical demonstrations to overwhelm a legal tribunal. This Essay shows that Dreyfus is not a case of mathematics run amok, unchecked and uncomprehended. To the contrary, the defects in the mathematical proof were dramatically exposed, and this evidence did not lead Dreyfus’s judges to condemn him. This history undercuts the reliance of modern courts and commentators on Dreyfus as an indication or illustration of the alleged dangers of probability evidence in criminal cases.
Volume 91 - No. 3
- Note: Address Confidentiality and Real Property Records: Safeguarding Interests in Land While Protecting Battered Women
- The Missing Pieces of Geoengineering Research Governance
- The Moral Psychology of Copyright Infringement
- Of Mice and Men: On the Seclusion of Immigration Detainees and Hospital Patients
- Public Enforcement Compensation and Private Rights
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