One of the most popular program models in criminal justice today is that popularized by Hawaii Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE). HOPE and other programs like it grow out of research suggesting that the most effective way to prevent violations of conditions of supervision is to more accurately detect them, respond to them immediately, and impose consistent and predictable sanctions for every detected violation. Proponents of these programs assert that they not only change behavior for the better, but that they increase the legitimacy of probation by addressing violations as they occur. Even if program compliance rates are as high as supporters claim, serious questions remain about whether these programs, while advancing compliance, may undermine the larger goal of promoting desistance from crime. Anecdotal evidence suggests that both the conditions and sanctions imposed on program participants are often significantly more severe than the model itself requires, and are sometimes at odds with encouraging behavior that is known to foster desistance. This Essay argues that system actors have an obligation to consider the purpose of correctional intervention when evaluating program “success.”
Volume 99 - Issue 5
- Note: Stranger than Science Fiction: The Rise of A.I. Interrogation in the Dawn of Autonomous Robots and the Need for an Additional Protocol to the U.N. Convention Against Torture
- SIRI-OUSLY 2.0: What Artificial Intelligence Reveals About the First Amendment
- The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing
- Regulating Cumulative Risk
- Toward a Critical Race Theory of Evidence
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