This Article presents a public choice analysis of how the executive branch in the United States determines questions of compliance with international law. In contrast to traditional theories that treat the state as a unitary entity, the public choice approach examines the different interests and incentives of the many executive branch agencies that advise the President about international law compliance. These agencies frequently disagree about the application of international law and the executive branch has failed to coordinate these interests consistently. The unpredictability of the process encourages agencies to compete for control over international legal policy. These institutional considerations go beyond other disaggregated or liberal theories that focus on the role of domestic actors. As a consequence, the public choice analysis leads to some distinct conclusions. First, it highlights how public choice can address some of the limitations of unitary state theories by explaining how state interests are formed. Second, it predicts that competition will encourage agencies to take advantage of areas of “softness” in international law—its imprecision, open-endedness, and lack of enforcement mechanisms. Agency officials benefit by keeping open the widest range of options under international law. Finally, if government officials in other countries face similar incentives, this provides another explanation for why international law does not display more clarity and stronger enforcement mechanisms.
News & Events
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Volume 97 Lead Piece Profiled in New York Times
The Volume 97 Lead Piece, a study of how the Supreme Court treats business interests by distinguished legal scholars Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, was profiled in the May 5, 2013 edition of the New York Times. The story, titled Corporations Find a Friend in the Supreme Court, [...]
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Volume 98 Spring Submissions Closed
The Minnesota Law Review has closed the spring submissions period for Volume 98. Submissions for Volume 98 will reopen on Thursday, August 1. Please see the submissions page for more details.
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Volume 98 Submissions Will Open Feb. 15
The Minnesota Law Review will begin accepting submissions for Volume 98 on Friday, February 15, 2013. Please see this page for more details.
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Minnesota Law Review Announces Volume 98 Editorial Board
The Minnesota Law Review is pleased to announce its Volume 98 editorial board, headed by Editor in Chief Jake Vandelist.
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Minnesota Law Review Announces 2013 Symposium Topic
The Minnesota Law Review is pleased to announce that its 2013 symposium will address the legal and political issues facing organized labor in the United States. The symposium will be held at the University of Minnesota Law School on October 25, 2013.
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