In certain regulatory regimes, including those governing banking and corporate law, firms are permitted to choose among multiple competing regulators. This Article examines the desirability of such regulatory competition in the context of property, casualty, and life insurance markets. It analyzes various different approaches to structuring such regulatory competition, including those embodied in two recent reform proposals, the Optional Federal Charter and the Single License Solution. Ultimately, the Article argues that regulatory competition of any sort would undermine the core goals of insurance regulation, harming consumers, insurers, and third parties.
Volume 94 - No. 6
- Note: Stranger than Science Fiction: The Rise of A.I. Interrogation in the Dawn of Autonomous Robots and the Need for an Additional Protocol to the U.N. Convention Against Torture
- SIRI-OUSLY 2.0: What Artificial Intelligence Reveals About the First Amendment
- The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing
- Regulating Cumulative Risk
- Toward a Critical Race Theory of Evidence
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