In certain regulatory regimes, including those governing banking and corporate law, firms are permitted to choose among multiple competing regulators. This Article examines the desirability of such regulatory competition in the context of property, casualty, and life insurance markets. It analyzes various different approaches to structuring such regulatory competition, including those embodied in two recent reform proposals, the Optional Federal Charter and the Single License Solution. Ultimately, the Article argues that regulatory competition of any sort would undermine the core goals of insurance regulation, harming consumers, insurers, and third parties.
Volume 94 - No. 6
- Note: Copyrighted Laws: Enabling and Preserving Access to Incorporated Private Standards
- Note: Embracing Ambiguity and Adopting Propriety: Using Comparative Law To Explore Avenues for Protecting the LGBT Population Under Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
- Note: Getting Back to Basics: Recognizing and Understanding the Swing Voter on the Supreme Court of the United States
- The Value of the Standard
- The Substantially Impaired Sex: Uncovering the Gendered Nature of Disability Discrimination
© 2011-2016 Minnesota Law Review. All Rights Reserved.