This Article adds to the emerging literature on rewards to promote effective capital market gatekeeping. Capital market gatekeeping theory traditionally relies heavily on threats of legal liability for failure to perform legally mandated functions (along with a presumed constraint imposed by reputation effects). The ineffectiveness of many gatekeepers in the past decade revealed limitations of the liability strategy and yet reforms continue to emphasize legal duties and liability for gatekeepers. This emphasis also has the negative side-effect of discouraging gatekeepers from willingness to perform desired functions—such as to detect for fraud. Using rewards can induce gatekeepers to perform desired functions and add positive incentives to encourage them to be more effective in vetting enterprises seeking access to capital.
Volume 92 - No. 2
- Note: Copyrighted Laws: Enabling and Preserving Access to Incorporated Private Standards
- Note: Embracing Ambiguity and Adopting Propriety: Using Comparative Law To Explore Avenues for Protecting the LGBT Population Under Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
- Note: Getting Back to Basics: Recognizing and Understanding the Swing Voter on the Supreme Court of the United States
- The Value of the Standard
- The Substantially Impaired Sex: Uncovering the Gendered Nature of Disability Discrimination
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