This Article adds to the emerging literature on rewards to promote effective capital market gatekeeping. Capital market gatekeeping theory traditionally relies heavily on threats of legal liability for failure to perform legally mandated functions (along with a presumed constraint imposed by reputation effects). The ineffectiveness of many gatekeepers in the past decade revealed limitations of the liability strategy and yet reforms continue to emphasize legal duties and liability for gatekeepers. This emphasis also has the negative side-effect of discouraging gatekeepers from willingness to perform desired functions—such as to detect for fraud. Using rewards can induce gatekeepers to perform desired functions and add positive incentives to encourage them to be more effective in vetting enterprises seeking access to capital.
Volume 92 - No. 2
- Note: Big Enough To Matter: Whether Statistical Significance or Practical Significance Should Be the Test for Title VII Disparate Impact Claims
- Note: Of Mosquitoes, Adolescents, and Reproductive Rights: Public Health and Reproductive Risks in a Genomic Age
- Note: Payments on Debt After Discharge: When a Discharge Is Not Really a Discharge and the Limits of Taxpayer Recourse
- Inherent National Sovereignty Constitutionalism: An Original Understanding of the U.S. Constitution
- Reproduction Reconceived
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